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ARTICLE
BUSINESS SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND DISCRIMINATORY
HIRING PRACTICES:
CONTRADICTORY OR COMPATIBLE?
ARTHUR

M.

WOLFSON*

INTRODUCTION

In 2003, two significant developments reflected the attitudes of
big business toward the value of racial difference. That year, the
Supreme Court decided the landmark cases Gratz v. Bollinger! and
Grutter v. Bollinger2 to address the constitutionality of race-based
affirmative action in university admissions policies. Those rulings
marked the culmination of support offered by representatives of big
business for such policies, voiced through their filings of amici
briefs. 3 Indeed, the significance of that support was not lost on the
Court, as the Grutter majority specifically incorporated references
to it in its rationale. 4 That same year, social scientists Marianne
Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan published a study revealing a
marked pattern of race-based discrimination in the hiring process of
* Candidate for J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2005; B.A., College
of William & Mary, 1999. I would like to thank Professors Lu-in Wang, Richard Del
gado, and Jean Stefancic for their insightful comments on earlier drafts and their sup
port in publishing this Article. I would also like to thank Professor James Flannery and
Dean David Herring for their ongoing leadership and guidance.
1. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
2. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3. See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses, Gratz v. Bollin
ger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No.
02-516) [hereinafter Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses]; Brief of Amici Curiae
Media Companies, Gratz (No. 02-241) and Grutter (No. 02-516); Brief of Amicus Cu
riae Gen. Motors Corp., Gratz (No. 02-241) and Grutter (No. 02-516); Brief of Amicus
Curiae BP America, Inc., Gratz (No. 02-241) and Grutter (No. 02-516); Brief of Amicus
Curiae ExxonMobii Corp., Gratz (No. 02-241) and Grutter (No. 02-516).
4. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
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a cross-section of American business. 5 The study has received wide
ranging acclaim as a legitimate indicator of the discrimination it
reveals. 6
These two developments appear wildly contradictory. The
briefs appear to represent a recognition of the value of increasing
minority employment on the part of big business. As such, a study
revealing significant patterns of race-based discrimination in the
hiring process would seem antithetical to the support reflected in
the briefs. Why would representatives of big business refuse to hire
members of the very minorities whose employment they seem to
embrace in the briefs?
A close examination, however, of the support offered by repre
sentatives of big business in the Gratz and Grutter litigation reveals
that no such contradiction exists. Such an examination reveals that
the primary rationale for this support is not to increase minority
hiring. Indeed, while an interest in increasing minority employment
is present in the briefs, the primary interest asserted is in hiring
employees who have been exposed to minorities as students, not in
necessarily hiring minorities themselves. Therefore, the support of
big business for race-based affirmative action in university admis
sions provides· no contradiction to the discriminatory hiring prac
tices observed by Bertrand and Mullainathan. Rather, the two
developments may be aptly viewed as quite compatible.
This Article explores the apparent contradiction between the
support big business gave to race-based affirmative action in uni
versity admissions, reflected by the amici briefs in Gratz and Grut
ter, and the racially discriminatory hiring practices revealed in the
study conducted by Bertrand and Mullainathan. Part I will describe
the support big business offered for race-based affirmative action in
the Gratz and Grutter cases. Part II will detail the study conducted
by Bertrand and Mullainathan, paying particular attention to their
assertion that the discrimination they describe is based on race. Fi
nally, in Part III, I will more closely examine the rationales put
forth in the amici briefs and compare those rationales to the find
5. MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, ARE EMILY AND GREG
MORE EMPLOYABLE THAN LAKISHA AND JAMAL? A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON LABOR
MARKET DISCRIMINATION, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, WORKING PAPER 9873
(2003).
6. See L.A. Johnson, Studies find that Afrocentric names often incur a bias, PITTS·
BURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 25, 2003, at D1; Alan B. Krueger, Sticks and Stones Can
Break Bones, but the Wrong Name Can Make a Job Hard to Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2002, at C2.
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ings of the study. In doing so, I will conclude that when taken to
gether, the two appear to constitute a stark contradiction while, in
actuality, they are indeed quite compatible.
I.

BIG BUSINESS SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE AcnON
IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS

The Gratz and Grutter litigation proved to be a landmark
event in Supreme Court jurisprudence on a variety of fronts. From
a legal standpoint, the case marked a statement of definition as to
the relevant precedent on the matter.1 Outside the legal arena, the
decisions had dramatic impact as well. The rulings charted the
course of public policy organizations from across the political spec
trum for the foreseeable future. s In the field of higher education,
the outcome served to define admissions policies for colleges and
universities across the country.9 For businesses, the decisions di
rectly affected recruitment and hiring practices. IO Because its im
pact reached so many sectors of society, interest in the case rose to
abnormally high levels.u Accordingly, the filings of amici briefs oc
curred in significantly high numbers.12
Decided on the same day, Grutter and Gratz marked the first
time the Supreme Court considered the use of race in higher educa
tion admissions programs since Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke .13
Both involved, inter alia, challenges based on the Equal Protection
7. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321. Specifically, the Court accounted for the judicial con
fusion surrounding Justice Powell's concurrence in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978). In that opinion, Powell opined that race could be considered in a
university admissions policy for the purpose of attaining a diverse student body. Bakke,
438 U.S. at 311 (Powell, J., concurring). The Grutter Court noted that circuits have
been split as to the precedential value of that opinion. Grutter, 389 U.S. at 325 (com
paring Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) and
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law
School, 233 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2000». The Grutter Court, however, chose not to de
cide the precedential value of the Powell concurrence in Bakke but rather only the
validity of its substance. Grutter, 389 U.S. 306; see also Thomas Ross, Innocence and
Affirmative Action, 43 V AND. L. REV. 297, 307 (1990) (noting in 1990 that "the constitu
tional status of affirmative action remains uncertain").
8. See Brief of the Cato Institute as Amici Curiae, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516).
9. See Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at
the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (2003).
10. See Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note 3, at 9.
11. Warren Richey, Court Takes Up Racial Preferences in Landmark Case, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2003, at 4.
12. Id.
13. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for which a classification
based on race may be deemed constitutional only if it serves a com
pelling state interest and its means are narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. 14
In Gratz, the plaintiff challenged the use of race in the Univer
sity of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy.15 While the
particulars of the policy changed over time, it consistently yielded a
result in which nearly all qualified African-Americans, Hispanics,
and Native Americans were offered admission. 16 In the final ver
sion of the admissions policy in the period relevant to the litigation,
the University employed a scale awarding applicants points for a
variety of characteristicsP The maximum a candidate could
achieve was 150 points, with 100 guaranteeing admission.1 8 The
university awarded twenty additional points for membership in an
underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.19
In Gratz, the petitioners were two white undergraduate appli
cants to the University.20 Both were denied admission, even though
the University's admissions office rated them as "well qualified"
and "qualified" respectively.21 In October 1997, the petitioners
filed a lawsuit claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.22
The district court granted the petitioners' motion to certify the law
suit as a class action on behalf of "those individuals who applied for
and were not granted admission ... who are members of those ra
cial or ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that defendants treated
less favorably on the basis of race in considering their application
for admission. "23
The Supreme Court concluded that the admissions policy in its
final form violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the plan was not narrowly tailored to meet
the compelling state interest of educational diversity.24 In line with
Grutter, the Court found the asserted state interest of educational
14. Id. at 326-27.
15. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253-57 (2003).
16. See id. at 249-50.
17. Id. at 255.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 251.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 252.
23. Id. at 252-53.
24. Id. at 275. The Court noted that it upheld the asserted compelling state inter
est of educational diversity in Grutter. Id. at 268.
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diversity to be compelling.25 However, the Court stated that the
twenty additional points awarded for a candidate's membership in a
racial minority constituted a "decisive" use of race in favor of "vir
tually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority appli
cant."26 It is this decisiveness in the policy's use of race that the
Court found constitutionally troubling. Specifically, the Court ex
plained that giving primacy to any single characteristic fails as a
means to further educational diversity.27
Grutter involved a challenge to the use of race in the admis
sions policy of the University of Michigan Law School.28 Unlike
the undergraduate admissions policy challenged in Gratz, the Law
School admissions policy did not place a definitively quantifiable
value on an applicant's membership in an underrepresented minor
ity. Instead, the Law School sought to enroll a "'critical mass' of
[underrepresented] minority students" by including race as a factor
in admissions decisions. 29
The petitioner in Grutter was a white applicant to the Law
School who was denied admission. 3D She filed suit in 1997, claiming
discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 31 Specifically, the petitioner asserted that "her appli
cation was rejected because the Law School uses race as a 'predom
inant' factor, giving applicants who belong to certain minority
groups 'a significantly greater chance of admission than students
with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.' "32
The Supreme Court found the Law School's admissions policy
to be constitutional.33 Of particular importance, the Court settled
the question of whether educational diversity, as asserted by Justice
Powell in Bakke, constitutes a compelling state interest. 34 The
Court, however, bypassed the controversy as to whether Powell's
opinion was binding by holding substantively that a state interest in
educational diversity is compelling. 35 The Court also found the
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 267.
Id.
Id.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003).
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 343-44.

34. For a review of the legal controversy surrounding the precedential value of
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, see supra note 7.
35. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
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Law School's means to be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 36
Specifically, unlike the means rejected in Gratz, the Court ap
proved the Law School's approach because it ascribed no fixed ben
efit to an applicant's race but instead used race in determining
admission in a "flexible, nonmechanical way."37
The litigation of Gratz and Grutter produced interest from a
multi-faceted cross-section of American society, marked notably by
the filing of amici briefs at unprecedented proportions. 38 Included
in these filings were those from representatives of American busi
ness who supported both the undergraduate and Law School's use
of race in their respective admissions policies.39 (Because amici
generally offered support for both the undergraduate and Law
School programs together rather than separately, I will hereinafter
collectively refer to them as "Michigan programs.").
A brief submitted by sixty-five leading American businesses
led the filings of amici briefs submitted by representatives of big
business in support of the Michigan programs. 40 In its introduction,
the brief stated as its main purpose that diversity in higher educa
tion is a compelling state interest, and that the Michigan programs
should therefore be deemed constitutiona1. 41 Central to the brief's
argument was the link between educational diversity and specific
business benefits derived therefrom. 42 The brief's proponents iden
tified four ways in which the education of students in diverse envi
ronments bears fruit in business practices:
First, a diverse group of individuals educated in a cross-cultural
environment has the ability to facilitate unique and creative ap
proaches to problem-solving arising from the integration of dif
ferent perspectives. Second, such individuals are better able to
develop products and services that appeal to a variety of consum
ers and to market offerings in ways that appeal to those custom
ers. Third, a racially diverse group of managers with cross
36. Id. at 334.
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 3. The two most prominent amicus briefs submitted by repre
sentatives of big business in support of the University of Michigan were the Brieffor 65
Leading American Businesses and the Briefof General Motors Corporation. Both Exx
onMobii Corporation and BP America submitted briefs in support of neither party.
40. Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note 3.
41. Id. at 2-3. Cf NAOMI KLEIN, No LoGO 107-24 (1999) (documenting how cor
porate America ultimately embraced the idea of diversity in order to create "a candy
coated multiculturalism," which has allowed "corporations ... to sell a single product in
numerous countries without triggering the old cries of 'Coca-Colonization' ").
42. Id. at 4.
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cultural experiences is better able to work with business partners,
employees, and clientele in the United States and around the
world. Fourth, individuals who have been educated in a diverse
setting are likely to contribute to a positive work environment,
by decreasing incidents of discrimination and stereotyping. 43

General Motors Corporation filed a similar brief in support of
the Michigan programs. 44 Its brief, however, more narrowly de
fined its interest in a university's consideration of race in admissions
as the development of "cross-cultural competence. "45 The brief de
fined this notion as "the capacities to interact with and to under
stand the experiences of, and multiplicity of perspectives held by,
persons of different races, ethnicities, and cultural histories."46
General Motors asserted that the necessity of this trait is rooted in
the expansiveness, and corresponding diversity, of the market it
serves. 47 Specifically, the proponents of the brief noted that "Gen
eral Motors' employees, customers, and business partners ... could
scarcely be more racially, ethnically, and culturally diverse."48
Therefore, General Motors believed hiring workers with "cross-cul
tural competence" would yield significant business benefits.
Like the brief filed by sixty-five leading American businesses,
the General Motors brief linked employees' development of cross
cultural competence to their experience in a diverse educational
setting. 49 The brief noted: "[S]tudents are likely to acquire greater
cross-cultural competence in a multicultural and multiracial aca
demic environment, in which students and faculty of different cul
tures and races interact, than they are in a homogeneous one, in
which cross-cultural communication is merely a theoretical
construct."50
The input of the business community was not lost on the Court.
In defining educational diversity as a compelling state interest in
Grutter, the Court took note of the benefits of a university's attain
ing a critical mass of diverse students for an array of interests in
society.51 With respect to business, the Court noted, "[t]hese bene
fits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have
Id. at 7.
Brief of Amici Curiae Gen. Motors Corp., supra .note 3.
Id. at 4.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.

51.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
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made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global mar
ketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."52 Therefore, the filings of
the briefs by representatives of big business played a significant role
in the Court's finding that educational diversity constituted a com
pelling state interest such that the Law School's admissions pro
gram was constitutional.
II.

REVIEW OF DISCRIMINATORY HIRING PRACTICES

The study conducted by Bertrand and Mullainathan provides a
significant account of racially discriminatory hiring practices among
a cross-section of American businesses. 53 The study compared re
sumes submitted by job applicants with "very White sounding
names"54 with those submitted by applicants with "very African
American sounding names. "55 The results reveal a success rate of
the former 50% higher than that of the latter. 56 Put differently, as
further delineated by the study, when compared with an African
American sounding name, a white sounding name produces a bene
fit to the applicant equal to an additional eight years of
experience.57
To conduct their study, Bertrand and Mullainathan sent re
sumes to employers in response to help-wanted ads in Boston and
Chicago.58 To each resume, they assigned a name deemed to be
either "very White sounding" or "very African American sound
ing. "59 To classify names, the researchers relied on "frequency data
calculated from birth certificates of all babies born in Massachusetts
between 1974 and 1979."60
The researchers also looked for disparities in the effect of dif
52.

Id.
BERTRAND & MULLAINAlHAN, supra note 5, at 3 (examining "a large spec
trum of job quality, from cashier work at retail establishments and clerical work in a
mail room to office and sales management positions").
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2-3.
57. Id. at 3.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7. Similar studies attesting to the notion of uniquely white or uniquely
African-American names are found elsewhere. See Johnson, supra note 6, at D1 (citing
the most popular baby names for black females, black males, white females, and white
males in 2002 as compiled by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, Bureau of
Health Statistics). See generally Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes
and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names, 119 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF
53.
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ferences in the credentials of job applicants with respect to each
racial classification. 61 Within each group, the researchers subdi
vided the resumes into "higher quality applicants"62 and "lower
quality applicants. "63 Each employer to whom the researchers re
sponded received four resumes: a higher qualified applicant with a
white sounding name, a lower qualified applicant with a white
sounding name, a higher qualified applicant with an African-Amer
ican sounding name, and a lower qualified applicant with an Afri
can-American sounding name. 64
The results of the study reveal a marked pattern of racial dis
crimination. A callback, via telephone or email, marked a success
ful response to a resume submission. 65 Whereas resumes with
white sounding names had a 10.08% chance of producing a
callback,66 resumes with African-American sounding names had a
6.70% chance of doing SO.67 These results represent a difference in
callback rates of 3.35 percentage points, or 50%.68 Viewed another
way, the study found that a job applicant with a white sounding
name can expect one callback for every ten resumes submitted
while a similar applicant with an African-American sounding name
can expect one callback for every fifteen resumes submitted. 69
The study'S assessment of the impact of higher quality versus
lower quality resumes further exemplified the racial discrimination
in the hiring process. Higher quality resumes from applicants with
white sounding names produced a callback rate of more than
11 %,70 while lower quality resumes from applicants with white
sounding names produced a callback rate of 8.8%.71 Thus, the dif
ference in callback rates between higher and lower quality resumes
ECONOMICS 767 (Aug. 2004), available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/joumals/pdf/qjec_119_
3_767_O.pdf.
61. BERTRAND & MULLAINATHAN, supra note 5, at 2.
62. Id.
63. Id. The researchers define a "higher quality" resume as one that indicates
more experience, fewer holes in employment history, more likely includes an e-mail
address, indicates the completion of certificate degrees, foreign language skills, and/or
awards or honors. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 12.
71. Id.
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was 2.51 percentage points or 30%.72 For applicants with African
American sounding names, higher quality resumes produced a
callback rate of 6.99% while lower quality resumes yielded a
callback rate of 6.41 %.13 Thus, the difference between callback
rates for higher and lower quality resumes for applicants with Afri
can-American sounding names is .58 percentage points, or 9%.
Therefore, applicants with white sounding names were rewarded at
a substantially higher rate for an increase in credentials than their
. counterparts with African-American sounding names.14
Bertrand and Mullainathan also assigned random addresses to
the resume of each fictional job applicant,75 Within each racial clas
sification, a portion of each group included addresses from "more
affluent" neighborhoods. 76 By doing so, the researchers sought to
ascertain the effect of neighborhood status on an applicant's pros
pects, particularly with respect to the different racial groups.77 This
feature of the study addressed the notion that African-American
sounding names serve as a proxy for socioeconomic disadvantage
rather than exclusively race,7s If this notion is correct with respect
to hiring patterns, and applicants from affluent neighborhoods are
appealing to employers, the presence of such a neighborhood
should compensate for the presence of an African-American
sounding name on an application. The study, however, did not indi
cate such a finding. 79 While applicants with African-American
sounding names did benefit from an affluent address, they did not
benefit at a rate higher than that of applicants with white sounding
names. SO Thus, the study concluded that an address in an affluent
neighborhood, while certainly providing benefit to all applicants,
does not provide the compensation for the African-American
sounding name that one would expect if that type of name served as
a proxy for socioeconomic disadvantage. S ! Therefore, according to
the study, the discrimination revealed was not based on socioeco
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Mullainathan was most troubled by this disparity of these rewards for in
creased credential statistics. In an interview with the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, he said,
"That, to me, was the most depressing part. When you show you have skills, you should
get a huge return, and [blacks] didn't." Johnson, supra note 6, at Dl.
75. BERTRAND & MULLAINATHAN, supra note 5, at 13.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 13-14.
78. Id. at 20.
79. Id. See also Fryer & Levitt, supra note 60, at 783-86.
80. BERTRAND & MULLAlNATHAN, supra note 5, at 20.
81. Id.
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nomic disadvantage but race. 82
In sum, the Bertrand and Mullainathan study reflected a
marked pattern of race-based discrimination in the hiring process. 83
The study revealed that applicants with distinctively African-Amer
ican sounding names receive drastically less favorable responses
from employers than those with distinctively white sounding
names. 84 The study further revealed that the presence of an Afri
can-American sounding name is a proxy for race, as opposed to less
competitive credentials or socioeconomic disadvantage. 85 Thus, the
study reflected a marked pattern of discrimination in the hiring pro
cess of American business that is specifically based on race.

III.

CONTRADICTION OR COMPATIBILITY?

On the surface, the support offered by representatives of big
business for the Michigan programs and the findings by Bertrand
and Mullainathan of race-based hiring discrimination appear to be
wildly contradictory. Of late, corporate America has recognized
the value of increased minority employment as a result of the rap
idly growing percentage of the American population comprised of
minorities and the corresponding increase in minority purchase
power. 86 Thus, it would be reasonable to interpret the amici briefs
described above as furthering an effort to increase minority hir
ing.87 Under this reading, these briefs and the findings of Bertrand
82. Id. Other studies have revealed similar race-based discrimination at different
stages in the hiring process. In particular, Floyd Weatherspoon described studies con
ducted by the Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington and the Urban Insti
tute involving the use of black and white testers in interviews. Floyd D. Weatherspoon,
The Devastating Impact of the Justice System on the Status of African-American Males:
An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 23, 53 (1994). Black and white testers
were paired according to similar education, demeanor, and experience. Id. They were
then trained to give similar responses to questions during the interviews. Id. The stud
ies revealed that in nearly all instances, "the white male 'testers' were either given the
job, treated more favorably, encouraged to apply for jobs with the employer, or offered
the higher level job." Id. Weatherspoon concluded, "[t]hese two employment audits
illustrate that when employers have an opportunity to hire qualified African- American
males, they still rely on stereotypical biases to deny them employment." Id.
83. See BERTRAND & MULLAINATHAN, supra note 5, at 26 ("African Americans
face differential treatment when searching for jobs and this may still be a factor in why
they do poorly in the labor market.").
84. Id. at 10.
85. See id.; see also Fryer & Levitt, supra note 60, at 770 ("Overall, Black choices
of first names today differ substantially more from Whites than do the names chosen by
native born Hispanics and Asians.").
86. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RrVER, 11-12 (1998).
87. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. This Article does not purport
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and Mullainathan appear to be starkly inconsistent. If the briefs
reflect an effort to increase minority hiring, why would businesses
systematically refuse to hire members of some of those very minori
ties when given the chance? A closer examination of the briefs, and
the reading given them by the Court, however, reveals that the sup
port they exemplify and the study's findings of discriminatory hiring
practices present no conflict at all, but rather, are quite compatible.
The compatibility of the findings of race-based discrimination
in hiring practices and big business's support for the Michigan pro
grams lies in characterizing its rationale for offering that support.
Representatives of big business could have based their support of
the Michigan programs on three potential rationales: (1) a rationale
that focuses exclusively or primarily on the interests of minorities;88
(2) a rationale in which its interests converge with those of minori
ties;89 or (3) a rationale based on interests that are exclusively its
own and devoid of any minority interests. 9o It is because the third
type of rationale receives primacy in the briefs and exclusivity by
the Grutter majority that it must be deemed the predominant ratio
nale. And it is because of this predominance in the rationale rooted
in exclusively corporate interests - and the eschewing of those
based on minority interests or interest-convergence - that corpo
rate support for the Michigan programs and findings of discrimina
tory hiring practices are indeed compatible ..
A minority-focused rationale appears nowhere in the briefs
submitted by representatives of big business in favor of the Michi
gan programs. 91 However, such rationales have been prevalent in
supporting both the Michigan programs specifically and affirmative
action in general.92 Therefore, I will return to a discussion of them
that an increase in minority hiring played no role in corporate America's support of the
Michigan programs. Rather, it asserts that this motivation was not primary.
88. See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARl 1. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK:
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 249-69 (1997).
89. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
91. See David Wilkins, From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is

Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the
Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 (2004) ("Neither corporate brief
makes more than a passing reference to the moral arguments in favor of helping blacks
to overcome slavery, segregation, or the stigma of racism ....").
92. See LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 88; Brief of Amicus Curiae, NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. & American Civil Liberties Union, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Brief for NAACP & ACLU].
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in conjunction with an examination of rationales eschewed by cor
porate America in favor of those that are exclusively corporate.
Representatives of big business did put forth rationales that ex
emplify interest convergence in their support of the Michigan pro
grams. That support for affirmative action may be predicated upon
converging interests emanating from Derrick Bell's theory of inter
est convergence in explaining civil rights progress. 93 In analyzing
Brown v. Board of Education, Bell explained the concept by stat
ing, "[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be ac
commodated only when it converges with the interests of whites."94
In the context of Brown, Bell asserted that white interests in the
political and economic gains resulting from school desegregation
had as much to do with the decision as minority interests in equal
education. 95 Bell's theory has wide-ranging ramifications in analyz
ing civil rights law and theory.96 It puts forth as a model for certain
civil rights concepts - such as affirmative action - an incorporation
of interests of mUltiple constituencies within a single rationale. 97
Put differently, under a rationale predicated upon interest conver
gence, even if it were not the intent of the party asserting the ratio
nale to incorporate minority interests, by virtue of the assertion of
that rationale, minority interests are also furthered when the propo
nent's interests are.
Of late, there has been a notable interest on the part of big
93. Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Conver
gence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980).
94. Id. at 523.
95. Id. at 524-25 (arguing that Brown "helped to provide immediate credibility to
America's struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging
third world peoples" and that it was a reflection of white business leaders' desire to
"make the transition from a rural, plantation society to the sun belt with all its potential
and profit"). See also FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 193 (1979) ("[W]ith the rise of
communism the United States was thrown into intense competition for world domina
tion, a circumstance that demanded an ideology of 'democracy' and 'freedom.' Increas
ingly the circumstances prevailing in the South constituted a national embarrassment
and support for these arrangements by dominant economic interests weakened.").
96. Richard Delgado's contrasting of Bell's theory with "'utility-based argu
ments,' [which] justify affirmative action on the ground that increased representation of
minorities will be useful to society" reflects how Bell's theory serves to critique these
rationales for affirmative action. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on
a Review o/Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 569 n.45 (1984). Because I
ultimately conclude that rationales based on interest convergence were not the primary
rationales of big business, it is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the social
desirability of such rationales.
97. In the context of the Michigan programs, the interests that converge are those
of minorities in obtaining employment and corporations in increasing minority hiring.
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business in increasing minority employment. 98 Several arguments
expressed in the briefs at issue reflect this interest. 99 These argu
ments, while rooted in the contexts of corporate interests, represent
a convergence of those interests with the interests of minorities in
obtaining employment. Because these arguments run concurrent
with minority interests in obtaining employment - no matter their
lack of explicit concern for the minority interest itself - they seem
to render this support for both Michigan programs antithetical to
the findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan. To that end, it would
seem inconsistent for corporate America to discriminate against ra
cial minorities in the hiring process if its support for the Michigan
programs were primarily rooted in the interest-converging rationale
of increasing minority hiring.
A closer examination of the briefs - and the reading the Court
gave them - reveals a primary corporate interest that does not con
verge with minority interests in employment. The bulk of corporate
interests in a race-based university admissions program has little to
do with increasing minority employment. Rather, the interest given
primacy, by both amici and the Court, is the exposure of potential
employees, regardless of race, to members of minority races while
attending a university (hereinafter "exposure rationale"). Because
the support of big business for the Michigan programs reflects less
of a concern for hiring minorities than for hiring employees who
were exposed to minorities as students, that support and the find
ings of Bertrand and Mullainathan are not contradictory. Further
more, when the presence of rationales that more readily further the
interests of minorities are present but eschewed, the support that
does exist and the findings of discriminatory hiring practices appear
to be quite compatible.
Unlike the rationales based on interest convergence, the expo
sure rationale is one rooted exclusively in corporate interests and is
utterly devoid of minority interests in employment. The basic tenet
of the exposure rationale is succinctly explained by the Brief of Ex
xonMobil Corporation, which states:
98. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
99. See Brief for 65 American Businesses, supra note 3, at 7 ("[A] racially diverse
group of managers ... is better able to work with business partners, employees, and
clientele in the United States and around the world."); Brief of Amicus Curiae Gen.
Motors Corp., supra note 3, at 23 ("If courts prohibit institutions of higher learning
from using race as a factor in admissions, businesses will find it more difficult to hire
superbly trained minority candidates."); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Media Compa
nies, supra note 3, at 2 ("Amici actively seek minority applicants ....").

2005] AFFIRMATWE ACTION & DISCRIMINATORY HIRING PRACTICES 211

[A]n institution with a culturally diverse student body produce[s]
graduates possessing the variety of perspectives that ExxonMobil
views as paramount to its success as a global business ... all indi
viduals educated at such an institution benefit from exposure to
students of widely diverse backgrounds-and this exposure, in
turn, benefits their employers. loo
Thus, according to the exposure rationale, it is beneficial for
business to hire employees who were exposed to minority view
points while students; as such, it is correspondingly beneficial to
business for universities to include minorities in their student
bodies.
The exposure of students to minority viewpoints that big busi
ness sought in its support of the Michigan programs is a common
occurrence in institutions of higher education. The implicit respon
sibility of exposing an entire student body to minority viewpoints is
very real for minority students. In describing their experiences,
Leslie Espinoza wrote, "[m]inority law students [are] a symbol for
their race. They are expected to have an unending commitment to
the 'community,' beginning with the law school community."101
Correspondingly, the presence of minorities generally produces the
desired exposure on the whole of a student body. In response to a
recent study conducted at the University of Florida College of Law
focusing on the effects of race and ethnicity in legal education,
"[a]lmost 70% of students agreed or strongly agreed that racial/eth
nic and gender diversity 'enhances [their] ability to get along better
with members of other races.' "102 Thus, in supporting the Michigan
programs based on the premise that minority students would ex
pose the entire student body to minority viewpoints, representa
tives of big business had solid reason to believe that such exposure
would actually occur.
The primacy of the exposure rationale is present in the Brief
for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses. While this brief
does include the argument that corporate interests converge with
100. Brief of Amicus Curiae ExxonMobil Corp., supra note 3, at 4.
101. Leslie Espinoza, Empowerment and Achievement in Minority Law Student
Support Programs: Constructing Affirmative Action, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 291
(1989). See also Rachel F. Moran, Commentary: The Implications of Being a Society of
One, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 503, 512 (1986). Citing a similar phenomenon that occurs for
law faculty, Moran writes, "[s]ome students and faculty will expect the minority or wo
man professor to serve as a representative of all minorities and women." Id.
102. Nancy E. Dowd & Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity Matters: Race, Gender, and
Ethnicity in Legal Education, 15 J.L. & PUB. POL'y 11,25 (2003).
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minority interests,103 the bulk of the rationale supports corporate
interests in hiring employees exposed to minority viewpoints. Such
an interest lacks any convergence with minority interests in
employment.
Amici's primary rationale is eVident in the "Introduction and
Summary of Argument," in which the brief offers nothing concern
ing an increase in minority employment but does state that, "[i]t is
essential that [students] be educated in an environment where they
are exposed to diverse people, ideas, perspectives, and interac
tions."l04 Furthermore, as discussed earlier, amici delineated four
specific benefits they derived from a university's consideration of
race in its admissions policy.105 One of those benefits, as noted in
this section, was a corporate interest in increasing minority employ
ment, an asserted benefit in which corporate interests converge
with minority interests in employment.1 06 However, the remaining
three asserted benefits strongly reflected corporate interests in hir
ing employees who were exposed to minorities as students, an inter
est that is devoid of any concern for minority hiring.107 Therefore,
the Brieffor Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses is more
firmly rooted in the corporate interest of hiring employees who
have been exposed to diversity rather than hiring a diverse
workforce.
The brief submitted by General Motors Corporation even fur
ther exemplifies the corporate interest in hiring employees exposed
to minorities as students rather than hiring the minorities them
selves. As noted above, General Motors quantifies this notion in
the term "cross-cultural competence."108 This concept is central to
the corporation's rationale for supporting the Michigan pro
grams. 109 What is particularly noteworthy about this concept is that
it is quantified as a skill to be acquired by potential employees of
the corporation. Inherent in the above-referenced definition is that
acquisition of cross-cultural competence occurs most readily
through exposure to students from a diversity of racial groups.ll0
103. See supra note 99.
104. Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note 3, at 2.
105. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 99.
107. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Specifically, the three asserted
benefits that reflect no convergence between corporate interests and minority interests
are the first, second, and fourth.
108. See Brief of Amici Curiae General Motors Corp., supra note 3, at 4.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 18 ("Open-mindedness and complex thinking are skills best honed
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General Motors linked the availability of that exposure to the pres
ence of minorities in a university setting,111 Presumably, it would
follow, acquisition of this skill would be most significant for those
who presently lack it. And those who presently lack it would pre
sumably be those who correspondingly lack exposure to minority
viewpoints prior to their university experience. 112 And, it would
seemingly follow, those who lack exposure to minority viewpoints
would more readily be members of the majority group, as minority
students would enter the university setting with that exposure al
ready.113 Thus, General Motors' interest in the acquisition of cross
cultural competence by its employees more readily reflected an in
terest in employing members of majority groups who have been ex
posed to members of minority groups as students than in employing
members of minority groups themselves.
The corporate interest in hiring employees who have been ex
posed to minorities in college is also given primacy by the Grutter
majority in legitimizing the Law School's use of race in its admis
sions program. As noted above, the Court specifically cited the
briefs submitted by representatives of big business in arriving at a
rationale for its holding. 114 Furthermore, the Court focused specifi
cally on the exposure rationale when citing business interest, noting
that "major American businesses have made clear that the skills
needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be de
veloped through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas,
and viewpoints."115 The Court did cite rationales based on interest
convergence when referring to briefs from other segments of soci
ety, such as the military. However, in referring to the briefs submit
ted by business, the Court gave primacy to the exposure rationale.
Thus, like amici themselves, the Court, when giving its reading of
business interests, eschewed rationales supporting these admissions
programs that either focus on or converge with minority interests in
favor of those that are exclusively corporate.
In contrast to the exposure rationale, other examples of recent
support for affirmative action have not been so devoid of minority
through exposure to multiple ideas and challenging debate in an educational environ
ment .... [R]acial and ethnic diversity enhances this process ....").
111. See id. at 20 n.2.
112. See id. at 19 ("Selective academic institutions offer a large percentage of
white students their first and last opportunity for significant contact with persons of
other races and cultures prior to entering the working world.").
113. Id.
114. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
115. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
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interest. Examples abound that reflect both a minority-focused ra
tionale and an interest-convergence rationale. Such examples exist
both in the support for other sectors of society for the Michigan
programs and in recent case law.
An amicus brief filed by the NAACP and ACLU reflects sup
port for the Michigan programs based on a minority-focused ratio
nale. It centered on minority interests in remedying past
discrimination and the role the Michigan programs may play in fur
thering those interests. 116 The underlying premise of the brief is the
presence of continuing and systemic race-based discrimination, spe
cifically "widespread racial inequality [as] a fundamental fact of
American life."117 The brief then detailed a variety of contexts in
which this systemic discrimination exists, including housing, educa
tional opportunities, job prospects, and health care. llS The brief's
proponents characterized the Michigan programs as an effort "to
redress systemic racial inequity."119 Thus, the brief submitted by
the NAACP and ACLU represents a minority-focused rationale for
supporting the Michigan programs; it promotes the interests of mi
norities in remedying the effects of discrimination as the basis for
their support.
An amicus brief filed by former high ranking officers of the
United States military in support of the Michigan programs repre
sents a rationale based on the convergence of interests. 120 The brief
premised its support on the notion that the American military oper
ates most effectively when its officer corps includes significant mi
nority representation. 121 According to the brief's proponents,
military benefits derived from an officer corps with minority repre
sentation include a decrease in racial tension, a more effective flow
of communication throughout the force, and a more favorable over
all perception of minorities who make up a sizeable portion of the
American military.122 The argument continued that these benefits
lead to greater military cohesion, which, in turn, leads to a more
116.
117.
118.
119.

Brief for NAACP & ACLU, supra note 92.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13·22.
Id. at 3.
120. Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius Becton, et aI., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02·241) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02.516).
121. Id. at 5.
122. Id. at 14 (describing how an officer corps that lacks minority representation
produces the opposite of these objectives).
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effective military.123 Thus, the brief's proponents established a link
between the military's interest in effectiveness and its interest in
minority's presence in its officer corps. Therefore, this brief put
forth a rationale for supporting the Michigan programs which are
rooted in a convergence of interests - the military's in effectiveness
and minority's in officer placement.
A similar rationale for supporting affirmative action is present
in recent case law. In Petit v. City of Chicago ,124 the Seventh Cir
cuit Court of Appeals upheld an employment promotion affirma
tive action program using a rationale representing a convergence of
employer and minority interests. 125 The case involved a challenge
against the Chicago Police Department by non-minority police of
ficers who applied for promotion to the rank of sergeant but were
denied. 126 The plaintiffs alleged that the affirmative action plan vi
olated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four
teenth Amendment. 127 The promotions were awarded based on an
examination, the scores of which were then standardized for race
and ethnicity.128 The court found the Police Department had an
interest in increasing its numbers of minority sergeants "to enhance
the operations of the [Chicago Police Department]."129 As such, it
had a compelling state interest to enact the affirmative action pro
gram. 130 Thus, the Police Department's interests in promoting mi
norities converged with minority interests in obtaining promotion.
The court gave credence to additional minority interests in detailing
why the Police Department may take such a position. Specifically,
the court noted that in a racially and ethnically diverse city such as
Chicago, minority representation in the police department im
proves police-community relations, which, in tum, allows police to
serve the community more effectively.l3l Thus, Petit reflects an af
123. Id. (arguing how an officer corps that lacks minority representation "under
mines military effectiveness").
124. 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
125. Id. at 1114.
126. Id. at 1112.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1117. The court explained that the standardizing of test scores is a
statistical process "of removing differences between ... two or more groups of test
takers." Id. In this case, the Police Department had found elements of test design that
favored white test-takers and decided to standardize for race and ethnicity accordingly.
Id.
129. Id. at 1114.
130. Id. at 1115. The court further held that the means of the program were nar
rowly tailored to its goals, such that it is constitutional. Id. at 1117.
131. Id. at 1115.
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firmative action program whose rationale represents a convergence
of employer interests in increased effectiveness and minority inter
ests in obtaining promotions and good policing.
Unlike the NAACP and ACLU brief, the brief submitted by
military representatives, or the Petit court, the briefs submitted by
representatives of big business eschewed as primary either a minor
ity-focused rationale or an interest-convergence rationale for sup
porting the Michigan programs. In contrast to the NAACP and
ACLU briefs, the briefs submitted by business representatives are
completely devoid of a minority-focused argument. 132 The differ
ence in rationale may be attributed to the difference in the stated
purpose of the organizational proponents,133 However, the point
remains that had the briefs submitted by representatives of big busi
ness employed a minority-focused rationale, its support for the
Michigan programs and the findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan
would have been contradictory.
The primary rationale of the briefs submitted by representa
tives of big business also diverged from the interest convergence
rationales put forth in the briefs submitted by military representa
tives and the Petit court. 134 The rationales put forth by the latter
two are rooted in an interest in increasing minority hiring. Unlike
the NAACP & ACLU brief, while this rationale does not center on
an express concern for minority plight, it does implicate minority
interests in obtaining employment and promotion. That is, if the
132. See supra note 91.
133. See Brief for NAACP & ACLU, supra note 92, at 1.
134. In a recent article, Kenneth L. Karst wrote of the similarities between the
brief submitted by military representatives and the briefs submitted by representatives
of big business. Kenneth L. Karst, Symposium: The Revival of Forward-Looking Af
firmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 60, 64-68 (2004). Karst noted that both include
an argument expressing a desire to increase minority hiring and concluded, "[t]he paral
lels between [The General Motors Corp.] brief and the brief focused on the armed
services are striking." Id. at 68. While, as noted earlier, I agree that both briefs do
include this argument, I disagree that the two are "parallel." The desire to increase
minority hiring is given primacy in the brief of military representatives, but the ratio
nale given primacy in the brief of the representatives of big business is the exposure
rationale. One only has to look at the difference in treatment given the two by the
Grutter majority to see this difference. The Court referred to both in deeming the Law
School's program constitutional. However, when referring to the support of big busi
ness, it stated: "Major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed ...
can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). When referring to the brief
of the military representatives, the Court cited the military's need for a "racially diverse
officer corps." Id. at 331. Thus, the Court's respective selections reflect the primacy of
the exposure rationale in the briefs of representatives of big business and the desire to
increase minority hiring in the brief of military representatives.
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interests of the military in employing minority officers and the in
terest of the Chicago Police Department in promoting minorities to
the rank of sergeant are furthered, minority interests in employ
ment and promotion will also be furthered. Thus, had representa
tives of big business asserted this rationale as primary, their support
for the Michigan programs and the findings of Bertrand and Mul
lainathan would also have been contradictory.
However, representatives of big business did not put forth as
primary either a minority-focused or interest-convergence rationale
in supporting the Michigan programs. Instead, their briefs assert as
primary the exclusively corporate exposure rationale. That the pro
ponents of the business briefs eschewed those in which minority in
terests would be furthered in favor of those that fail to further
minority interests, reflects a low priority of furthering the interests
of minorities in securing a place in the business world. It is here
that the compatibility between big business's support for the Michi
gan programs and the findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan be
comes apparent. As previously noted, Bertrand and Mullainathan
demonstrated that the discrimination they found was not based on
socioeconomic status but race.135 Corporate America's support for
the Michigan programs accounted for race and the benefits of the
presence of racial difference in the university setting. However, the
striking primacy given to rationales that do not reflect a similar val
uation of racial difference in hiring practices - when such rationales
are readily available - reflects a lack of similar valuation of racial
difference at the hiring stage. As such, when presented with such a
stark pattern of race-based discrimination as appears in the findings
of Bertrand and Mullainathan, the briefs submitted by similar rep
resentatives of big business should be viewed as compatible, not
contradictory.
CONCLUSION

Two developments of 2003 reflecting the attitude of American
business toward racial difference - the Grutter and Gratz decisions
and publication of the study conducted by Bertrand and Mul
lainathan - appear to be wildly contradictory. The former repre
sented the culmination of support for race-based affirmative action
programs in university admissions; the latter revealed systemic ra
cial discrimination in hiring practices. The apparent contradiction,
however, may be reconciled by closely examining the primary ratio
135.

See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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nale representatives of big business asserted in offering their sup
port. That rationale is most aptly characterized as the exposure
rationale, a justification rooted in exclusively corporate interests
and devoid of minority interests. As such, the filing of the amicus
briefs supporting the Michigan programs and results of the study
present no contradiction but rather compatibility.

